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ON THE HORNS OF A DILEMMA
The Uneasy Partnership Between
Advocacy and Social Science
By
Karl R. White
Most of us living in the United States enjoy the highest standard of living
in the history of the world. Taken together, the tec.hnological, cultural,
recreational, medical, and educational opportunities of our society are
unsurpassed. But we also face an abundance of critical social problems.
Widely quoted and seemingly accurate statistics which describe such
problems include, but are not limited to the following.
• Last year 1.2 million American teenagers became pregnant;
400,000 of those pregnancies ended in abortion.
•

Homelessness has reached epidemic proportions with over 3
million people reportedly being homeless. Families are the
fastest growing segment of the homeless.

•

The number of families living in poverty has increased by 40%
in the last 5 years. Today one out of every two Black children and
two out of every five Hispanic children are living in poverty.

•

Single-parent families comprise one-quarter of all American
families. An increasing number of divorced and abandoned
women are the sole source of support for their children. The
inadequate availability of affordable, high-quality day care
places these parents in untenable situations and creates serious
risks for their children.

•

The United States has a higher infant mortality rate than 27 other
nations, including Singapore, Malta, and Cyprus.

•

Although the use of illegal drugs has recently declined among
American youth, over 60% of children try an illegal drug before
leaving high school.

•

Homicide is the second and suicide is the third leading cause of
death for all teens, and the rate of teenage suicide is rising.

•

One in seven youngsters fails to complete high school 23 million
adult Americans are functionally illiterate.
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•

Nearly one in five American children has no medical insurance
(either private, employer provided, or Medicaid). Medicaid
provides health services to less than one-half of our country's
poor pregnant women and children.

The list of urgent social needs is almost endless. In addition to those
listed above, people are justly concerned about our inadequate prison
systems, high rates of alcoholism and depression, unavailability of early
childhood education, the lack of affordable housing, the incidence of
child abuse and neglect, the increase of stress-related illnesses, etc., etc.
Unfortunately, listing statistics about such problems tends to numb our
sensitivity to how critical these problems really are. Unless we are
careful, it is easy to forget that such statistics represent real people with
real problems who often live in desperate situations. To set a context for
what I want to say about the dilemma faced by those who advocate for
solutions to such problems, let me give you two brief glimpses of people
whose lives are fraught with some of these problems. The excerpts are
from interviews that actually took place.
No, my children don't go to school. You see, you need an
address to go to school. We live in a car.
There is my husband, myself, and our two daughters. We had a
house. Then the business my husband worked for went bankrupt. He was only able to get minimum pay jobs since then. He
worked all the time day and night, but he was not even earning
$5 an hour. It was not enough to make our house payments-$700 a month--and eat too. We found a one bedroom apartment we could afford to rent and still have enough to eat.
Then one night, my husband didn't come home. I don't know
what happened to him. I don't think he would desert us. He
loved us. I think it was the neighborhood we rented in. There
were terrible people--the things some of those young boys used
to say to me and my daughters when we went out. They'd leer
at me and say terrible things.
I reported my husband missing to the police. They said they
would help and an officer did come by the apartment a few days
later. That's the last I heard. I used to stop by the police
station every few days to see if they learned anything, but they
hadn't found him. I went down to the morgue once to look at a
man. That was terrible. It was not my husband.
Then I couldn't pay the rent. The landlord was very mean. He
evicted us the day after the rent was due. That's when we
started living in the car.
Yes, I've appliedfor welfare. That was diffiCUlt because I didn't
have an address. I haven't gotten a welfare check yet. We stay
in shelters, but you can only stay there a few nights. I have to
2

be careful. I can only move the car a few blocks at a time
because it's running out of gas.
How are we eating? We're begging. I am sure people give us
money because of the children. What am I going to do?

•••••
My son is into drugs. He doesn't attend classes. The principal
says he walks the halls. The principal says he can't continue to
walk the halls. He is going to have to leave school. What is he
going to do if he leaves school? What's going to happen to
him?
The school says he needs drug treatment. I agree. I don't have
medical insurance. The drug detoxification center won't take
him unless I can guarantee to pay the bill. I can't. I have three
other children. My wife and I are barely making it now.
My work? I am a laborer. I work for contractors when jobs
come up. Benefits? You have to be kidding. I'm lucky to get the
work. Straight salary--paid in cash. No records. No benefits.
No drug therapy for my son.
I am thinking of going to work for Burger King. I could get
benefits there. But, my other kids would suffer because I
couldn't make enough money for food and housing.

The Dilemma
The statistics and the excerpts from these people's lives set the stage for
the title of this lecture: On the Horns of a Dilemma: The Uneasy Partnership Between Advocacy and Social Science. The dictionary defines
a dilemma as a situation involving choice between equally unsatisfactory
alternatives. The phrase "On the horns of a dilemma" was first used by
the Greek rhetoricians. Lemma means something which is taken for
granted, a dilemma is a double lemma, or a two-edged sword--or
according to the Greeks, a bull which will toss you whichever hom you
lay hold upon.
Faced with societal problems of the nature referred to above, the advocate
tries to convince someone of the urgency of the problem and to implement a proposed solution--some type of intervention which will ameliorate or even eliminate the problem. The question is always what type of
intervention is best. For example, will a reduction in the infant mortality
rate be achieved most cost efficiently by expanding Medicaid coverage
for poor women, educating physicians in the latest techniques, reducing
the frequency of caeserian section births, funding a national health insurance program, spending more on medical research, or mounting an
educational campaign to encourage more extensive use of prenatal care
by pregnant women?
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For most problems, there are far more potential solutions than either
money or interest. Thus, politicians, government leaders, and private
groups must choose between competing alternatives. In most cases, a
consideration of possible alternatives is preceded by an even more basic
question--should infant mortality even be addressed or should they focus
their attention and limited resources on increased rates of crime, homelessness, teen-age suicide, alcoholism, early childhood education, etc.,
etc. The advocate has two challenges. First, to convince the decision
makers that a particular problem is important enough to address; and
second, that the solution the advocate is proposing is really the best from
among the alternatives.
The dilemma faced by the advocate is that if the argument is made based
on political persuasion, emotion, common sense, or intuition; decision
makes will often demand better data about the urgency of the need and
the probability that the proposed solution will be effective. It is in trying
to collect such data, however, that the advocate frequently becomes
impaled on the dilemma's other hom. Either the data is not easily available and will take too long or be too expensive to collect; or what data are
available are contradictory to the position being advocated. If the advocate waits to collect data, the opportunity may be lost and the available
money spent elsewhere. If the advocate attempts to argue the case
without such "scientific data" the decision makers will often give priority
to those who have data. Thus, the advocate is caught on the horns of a
dilemma--and all because of the decision makers' preoccupation with
SCIence.

Defining Science and Advocacy
To understand the dilemma faced by advocates, let me first clarify how I
will use the terms "advocacy" and "science." Science is the pursuit of
truth. Scientists seek to understand, predict, and explain phenomena. By
definition, science is objective, impartial, and unbiased. Scientists are
obligated to provide a balanced, objective interpretation of data, even
when the interpretation of those findings may be unpopular or contradictory to previous findings. The very essence of science is replication, and
scientific findings which have not or cannot be replicated have little
value.
By contrast, advocates seek to protect and enhance the interests and
welfare of those for whom they advocate. Advocacy is unashamedly
biased, partial, ('.TId somewhat selective in the information presented.
Although it has not always been an expectation that advocates use scientific data in their advocacy efforts, such an expectation is becoming
common place. Earlier advocacy efforts for societal needs have depended
very little on scientific data. For example, the merits of deinstitutionalization for handicapped people were argued for on the basis of what was
morally correct, humane, and appropriate. Little if any reference was
made to data. Frequently used bases for advocacy include morality,
equality, justice, legality, and political patronage; but there is an increasingly frequent expectation that such advocacy will be backed up with
facts and figures.
4

Although there is an increasing expectation that advocacy efforts will
include some data, almost everybody agrees that it is inappropriate for
science to use many of the techniques which are acceptable for advocacy.
For example, advocates may argue a position based on feelings, popular
opinion, and hopes; whereas a scientist is expected to argue based only on
facts which have been impartially collected and are subject to independent replication.
The types of societal needs referred to above are real and in urgent need
of solutions. Based on its ability to literally transform the world in other
areas, many people have high expectations for the ability of social science
to make the same sorts of contributions in solving society's ills as science
made in developing atomic power, perfecting heart transplants, creating
plastics, and putting man on the moon. As Bertrand Russell (1951) noted
We are only at the very beginning of [science's]
almost 40 year ago,
work in transforming human life." (page 1)
It • • •

Unfortunately, the positive contributions of science to solving societal
problems have been meager to date. Even though we have achieved stunning technological and medical advances in the last 20 years, we have
done little to alleviate human suffering, improve education, or eliminate
many of the social injustices which exist. Why, if science has been so
successful in making technological and medical advances, has the
progress been so meager in addressing these social needs? A major part
of the answer is that scientific information frequently accumulates too
slowly and yields information which is too narrow or overly qualified for
addressing societal needs. As Walter Mondale once told the American
Educational Research Association, "I need a one-armed scientist. I am
tired of you people telling me, 'On the one hand . . . but, on the other
hand.'" Consequently, in those situations where decisions are needed but
good data are not available, people advocate for a solution based on their
intuition, logic, emotion, and powers of persuasion. Unfortunately,
people often advocate as if conclusive scientific evidence exists, when it
does not. Such inappropriate use of data is referred to here as the use of
pseudo-scientific data. There are at least three negative consequences
associated with the use of pseudo-scientific data.
First, when pseudo-scientific data are used in advocacy efforts, encouragement is given to the widespread use of unproven practices. Some such
practices will eventually prove to be effective (for example, reducing
cholesterol as a means of reducing the risk of heart disease was widely
advocated before there was conclusive scientific data). Some such practices will be harmless, but ineffective, such as the use of Laetrile in the
treatment of cancer. The danger in such instances is that people will be
placated by a harmless but ineffective treatment and will consequently
not seek out more effective treatments. For example as far as we know,
there is nothing physically harmful about taking Laetrile to cure cancer.
However, people receiving Laetrile treatment are less likely to seek other
effective forms of treatment. A few practices for which people advocate
prematurely will actually be harmful, such as megavitamin therapy, the
use of the Thamidolide, and blood letting.
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A second problem with using pseudo-scientific data as a part of advocacy
efforts is that it often creates inappropriately high expectations among
consumers, administrators, and funding agencies. All too often, specific
reforms or programs designed to deal with societal problems are advocated as if they were certain to be successful. If these expectations are
not achieved, public and private support can boomerang, resulting in an
unwillingness to even address the problem area in the future.
Third, advocacy based on pseudo-scientific data often inhibits future
research on those same questions. Having heard the incessant repetition
of such data by advocates, funding agencies refuse to provide funding for
such research because they believe that those questions have already been
sufficiently answered. Thus, in the long term, the extensive use of
pseudo-scientific data retards and sometimes even prevents the collection
of the very data which are needed.

The Value of the Scientific Method
It is not that anybody questions the value of good data. The question is
how to obtain such data for use in making decisions about which societal
problems to address and how to solve them. Philosophers of science
(e.g., Buchler, 1955; Cohen & Nagel, 1934) have suggested that there are
at least four ways of knowing--all of which are relevant to making such
decisions. The first is the method of tenacity. People who use this
approach defend their positions through frequent and vigorous repetition
of what they believe to be "obviously true." They operate on the principle
that if you say something often enough, people will believe that it is true.
How often have you heard that if you give your children sugar, they will
become more hyperactive? It so happens that even though there is absolutely no evidence to support this position; it has been repeated so often
that most people believe it is true.
A second method of knowing is the method of authority. In this case, a
particular position is adhered to because it has been advanced by someone
who ought to know (e.g., an "expert"). How many weight reduction
programs are tried by people because the program was developed by a
physician and physicians are seen by many people as experts regarding
physical health? A third approach is the method of intuition, in which a
particular position is preferred because it appeals to "common sense" or
"seems logical". Although there is nothing wrong with "common sense",
it can sometimes be misleading. These three approaches to gaining and
using knowledge are what are used most frequently by advocates. They
are used frequently because they are flexible, fast, and economical.
The least frequently used approach for determining the efficacy of a
particular program is the scientific method of knowing. It is seldom used
in advocacy efforts because it is slow, relatively expensive, and its results
are unpredictable. The scientific method is well established in other
areas, however, and has been used in countless thousands of studies from
agriculture to medicine. One of the earliest examples is recorded in the
Bible where Daniel of Lion's Den fame was held hostage in Nebuchadnezzer's court. For religious reasons, Daniel and his friends wanted to eat
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a mix of vegetables called pulse instead of the king's food. The Icing's
servant feared for his own life if he agreed to Daniel's request. Daniel
proposed a controlled experiment and promised to eat the Icing's food if,
at the conclusion of this experiment, his diet did not prove to be just as
good. Quoting from a translation of the original article, (Daniell: 12-15)
Prove thy servants, I beseech thee, ten days; and let them
give us pulse to eat, and water to drink.
Then let our countenances be looked upon before thee , and
the countenance of the children that eat of the portion of the
king's meat: and as thou seest, deal with thy servants.
So he (the servant) consented to them in this matter, and
proved them ten days.
At the end of the ten days, their countenances appeared
fairer and fatter in flesh than all the children which did eat
the portion of the king's meat.

Although we may quibble about the specifics of this design--subjects
were not randomly assigned groups, pretest data were not available, the
experiment was of rather short duration for a nutrition study, and outcome
measures were arguably subjective--the critical issue--and this is what is
relevant to the dilemma faced by advocates of social needs--was that one
group received one type of intervention, the second received another.
After a time period, data were collected to see which group was functioning best.
The benefits of this comparative-experimental approach have been
demonstrated thousands of times. Sometimes the results confirm clinical
jUdgment, as when researchers confirmed that continual low doses of
aspirin would reduce the incidence of repeat heart attacks--sometimes the
results are surprising. Researchers using the scientific method attempt to
define and isolate a single agent (or variable) in order to establish causal
relations between observed phenomena and possible agents. Although
there are many approaches, randomized experiments are one of the most
widely accepted methods of establishing such causal linkages.
The term "randomized experiments" refers to the process of randomly
assigning subjects to groups (i.e., ensuring that every subject has an equal
chance of being in any group) to increase the probability that groups will
be comparable on all variables that might affect the outcome except for
group membership. Thus, any differences between the groups at the end
of the experiment can be more confidently attributed to the differences in
treatment rather than some extraneous variable.
As a more modem example of a randomized experiment, consider the
recent case of a drug propranolol which was alleged to prevent reoccurrence of heart attacks (Borg & Gall, 1985). To determine the efficacy of
this particular drug, almost 4,000 patients who had previously suffered at
least one heart attack were randomly assigned to one of two groups. One
group received propranolol, the other did not. At the conclusion of the
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experiment, the mortality rate from new heart attacks was 28% lower in
the propranolol group than in the comparison group. Because the only
systematic difference between the two groups was that one had received
propranolol and one had not, the difference in mortality rate was attributed to the drug.
Obviously, the use of randomized experiments is not the only way to
establish a cause and effect relationship (e.g., it is now well-accepted that
smoking is causally related to lung cancer even though randomized experiments have not been conducted), but it is one of the most efficient
methods and has been used successfully in many different areas. Such
research has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of many otherwise popular
treatments (e.g., dietary treatments of hyperactivity, Spring & Sandoval,
1976; cell therapy for Down syndrome children, Pruess & Fewell, 1985;
the use of laetrile in cancer therapy, Newell & Ellison, 1980; and Doman
Delecato treatments for learning disabled children, Glass & Robbins,
1967). In many other cases, randomized experiments have established
the benefits of a particular treatment (Mosteller, 1981),--even in cases
where the value of the treatment was not particularly obvious (e.g., the
effectiveness of fluoride in reducing the incidence of dental caries,
Blayney & Hill, 1976; or the fact that trained paraprofessionals can
provide certain services as effectively as professionals, Durlak, 1979;
Pezzino, 1986; Shortinghuis & Frohman, 1974).

Objections to the Use of the Scientific Method
in Evaluating Social Programs
In spite of the historically demonstrated value of randomized experiments, they are seldom used by advocates for various social programs and
many people believe that such designs are inappropriate for drawing
conclusions about the value and benefits of interventions designed to
address societal problems. The most frequently cited arguments can be
summarized in three broad and somewhat overlapping categories.
The first argument suggests that randomized experiments are unnecessary because the information needed to decide whether a particular
approach is beneficial is more easily available from other sources. The
second argument is that randomized experiments are impractical due to a
wide variety of logistical, political, and technical difficulties. And,
finally, it is argued that randomized .experiments are unethical and probably illegal because the process of randomization requires that needy
people be denied treatment or assigned to an undesirable treatment.
I will argue that each such objection to the use of randomized experiments in evaluating the value of social programs is incorrect. Such
designs are valuable and should be more widely used. The absence of
such experiments has been a serious impediment to the advancement of
knowledge about how societal needs should be addressed. Such designs
are feasible to implement and, if properly conducted, are neither unethical
nor illegal. Furthermore, if such designs were used more frequently, the
advocate's dilemma referred to earlier would be substantially lessened.
8

Are Randomized Experiments Necessary?
Even though opponents agree that randomized experiments would
provide good information about which program is most effective, they
argue that there are other ways of knowing which are adequate, and easier
to implement. Obviously, there are many instances where causal inferences can be made confidently without data from a randomized experiment: A particularly strong wind topples a tree, an earthquake causes a
building to crumble, modeling causes a young child to learn to speak
English instead of German. Because there are no plausible alternative
explanations in these instances, it would be foolish to argue with the
validity of the causal inference. However, in determining which type of
intervention is most effective in addressing a particular societal need,
alternative explanations abound and serious mistakes are sometimes
made.
Professional judgment or common sense is probably the most frequently
used basis for arguing that a particular approach is best for addressing a
given need. Whitehead (1911) noted that common sense can be a bad
master. "Its sole criterion for judgment is that the new ideas shall look
like the old ones." For example, it was common sense to many educators
of the nineteenth century that punishment was the most effective way to
motivate children to learn. We now have evidence that reward is actually
a much more powerful way to motivate children.
Of course, professional judgment is often correct and has led to significant advances. Occasionally, however, over reliance on professional judgment leads to serious mistakes. One dramatic example comes from the
late 1940's, when technological advances in incubators for low birthweight babies made it possible to systematically monitor the amount of
oxygen provided to such infants. Because respiratory distress was the
highest cause of morbidity and mortality among such infants, it was
reasoned that increasing the concentration of oxygen would result in
better outcomes. Encouraged by anecdotal reports and their own
common sense, physicians across the country began the practice.
Within a short time, the incidence of retrolental fibroplasia (which leads
to blindness) increased dramatically among such infants. Some suggested
that the increased exposure to oxygen was responsible. However, the
notion was initially rejected because it was counterintuitive that something as essential as oxygen--particularly when it was needed to treat
respiratory distress--could be harmful. Eventually, randomized experiments were conducted and it was conclusively demonstrated that oxygen
was the culprit (Godron, 1954).
Such errors are not isolated occurrences. Gilbert, McPeek, and Mosteller
(1977), using INDEX MEDICUS as a source, analyzed all randomized
experiments of major surgical and anesthetic innovations conducted
between 1964 and 1973. Because of the life-threatening nature of the
problems being treated, all 36 of the innovations they examined were
supported by a great deal of professional judgment, anecdotal evidence,
and correlational data prior to implementation of the randomized ex peri9

ment. Nevertheless, the results of the trials indicated that more than half
of the innovations were actually worse than the standard technique to
which they were compared. Eleven percent were equally as good and
thus provided an alternative approach that might be useful in specific
circumstances, while only 33% were actually better. From these examples, it is clear that professional judgment should not be the sole means of
deciding which treatment is best.
The use of correlational research is sometimes suggested as another alternative to randomized experiments and there are many examples of important causal relationships which have been established on the basis of such
research (e.g., the relationship between cholesterol and heart disease).
However, before deciding that correlational research is preferable to
randomized experiments for a given issue, one should consider the
tedious and time consuming exclusion of alternative explanations
required to make causal inferences from correlational data. Unless such
work is done, correlational research can lead to seriously inaccurate
conclusions.
For example, a study of the correlation between amount of psychotherapy
and measures of psychological well-being might conclude that psychotherapy is harmful because those patients who receive the most psychotherapy are least healthy. A more plausible explanation is that those
people who only have minor problems are "cured" relatively quickly and
thus receive very little psychotherapy. The more severe cases are likely
to receive extended therapy, and those cases are least likely to show
dramatic progress because the disease is so far advanced. Similar examples abound. Sick people are most often found in hospitals, but not necessarily because hospitals cause sickness; police officers are found near the
scene of the crime more frequently, but not because police officers
commit more crimes than anybody; and students who receive tutoring
generally receive lower grades than untutored students because it's generally only the students who are already receiving failing grades who seek
out tutoring.
Are Randomized Experiments Practical?
A frequent argument against the use of randomized experiments is that
even though they would provide useful information, administrators,
service providers, and parents would never allow such experiments to be
conducted in evaluations of social programs. The alleged opposition to
randomization would occur because nobody would agree to participate in
a study in which they knew that some people would be denied services or
that some would be receiving less effective services. Both logic and
experience sugges: that such opposition is more imagined than real.
Consider the question of what types of services are best for young handicapped children. At the present time, such children are arbitrarily
provided with varying amounts and types of early intervention based
primarily on what is popular and/or affordable in that particular area or
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where the administrator of the program received his or her training. In
any large metropolitan city, some handicapped preschool children will be
receiving home-based intervention, some will receive center-based intervention, and some will receive a combination of center- and home-based
intervention. Some will be provided with a highly structured teacherdirected curriculum, while others will be given a more child-directed
humanistic curriculum. Some children will attend intervention for five
days a week, others will be visited as little as once a month. These variations are not explained to any substantial degree by on the type and
severity of the handicap, the age of the child, or preferences of the
parents. In other words, the type of intervention provided to children is
constantly varied as a function of the experiences, biases, and resources
of individual service providers.
It is difficult to imagine a situation which is more ideal for randomized
experiments. Furthermore, the fact that there are not enough early intervention services to go around, coupled with the absence of certainty about
what type of program is most effective, creates a situation in which
randomized experiments are clearly feasible and, therefore, probably the
best way for deciding who gets what. Unfortunately, such experiments
are seldom done.
One of the easiest situations for randomized experiments is where there is
not enough of the treatment for everybody to participate. Consider the
Salk poliomyelitis vaccine trials in which some children were given the
vaccine, while others were given an inert saline placebo. _ All children
could not be given the vaccine because it was physically and technologically impossible to produce enough vaccine during the first year. Some
argued that the vaccine should be distributed on a first-come first-serve
basis. However, such an allocation would have discriminated against less
well-educated families, because they would not have been aware of the
availability of the vaccine. Thus, the creation of randomized experimental and control groups was not only a highly moral allocation of a
scarce resource, but it also provided definitive information about the efficacy of the vaccine.
Program administrators often argue that parents will not agree to participate in randomized trials. Our experience is much different. In over 20
studies conducted during the last five years at the Early Intervention
Research Institute, acceptance rates by parents to the condition of random
assignment has ranged from 85% to 98%. Similar figures are reported by
Ramey (1985) for his Abecedarian and CARE projects and by Gross
(1985) for the Infant Health and Development Project, both of which are
treatment versus no treatment studies. Such high acceptance rates suggest
that randomized experiments can be conducted in a way which is acceptable to administrators, service providers, and consumers.
Are Randomized Experiments LegaIlEthical?
Random assignment of children to treatment versus no treatment groups
or to comparative treatment groups would be unethical in those situations
11

where there is proof that one treatment is superior and sufficient resources
for that particular treatment are generally available in similar circumstances. Neither of these conditions are present in most situations where
decisions concerning social programs must be made.
The most important condition is that unequivocal information is available
about what works best. At the present time, most people rely on professional judgment for making such decisions. However, professional judgment is sometimes incorrect about what is best in a given circumstance.
The example described earlier about high concentrations of oxygen for
premature low birth weight babies is one of the most obvious, but it is not
an isolated occurrence. Consider the following two examples; one from
medicine, and one from early childhood education.
Gilbert, Light, and Mosteller (1975) described an experiment to determine if a major contributor to skyrocketing medical costs was the fact
that insurers would only pay for work done in the hospital. It was hypothesized that inpatient services (which were relatively more expensive),
were being used in instances where outpatient services would have been
just as good; and that substantial saving would result if insurers would
pay for outpatient services in cases where it could be appropriately substituted for inpatient services. An experiment was conducted in which
15,000 people were randomly assigned to a group in which the outpatient
benefits were added on a trial basis, or to a group in which the regular
program remained in effect. A year later, the results were completely
contrary to expectations. Medical costs for the group with the added
outpatient benefits rose by 16% while that for the group with regular
benefits increased by only 3%. Both logic and professional judgment
were incorrect.
Another example where common sense was incorrect is from a study of
programs for early childhood special education. In a study conducted in
Great Britain (Sandow & Clarke, 1978; Sandow, Clarke, Cox, & Stewart,
1981) children were divided into matched groups in which the first group
received a home-based intervention program with individual visits at twoweek intervals. The second received a similar home-based intervention
program but were only visited once every eight weeks, and the third
group received no intervention. It was hypothesized that the morefrequently visited group would make the greatest gains. Contrary to
expectations, the group visited least frequently did the best. Although
these differences faded out in follow-up analysis (Sandow et al., 1981),
the fact remains that the more intensive treatment was worse in the short
run and no better in the long run.
Standards for what constitutes adequate intervention are generally based
on intuition, collective wisdom, and/or clinical judgment; some of which
is correct, some of which is probably not. Consider the situation in which
half-day center-based programs are provided to 3- to 5-year old handicapped children, but there are not enough resources to serve all handicapped children in the catchment area. Consequently, services are
provided to those who sign up first and others are put on a waiting list.
Unfortunately, the position that a certain minimal level of services must
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be provided (in this case five half-days each week) is seldom based on
any sound empirical data. It may be that a three-day-a-week intervention
program or a home-based program in which visits are made to each
family once a week would be just as effective and more cost effective. If
the more limited program were just as effective, additional children could
be served. Consequently, some children may be going without services
because the service provider is insisting on meeting a "standard" for
which there is no real proof.
This problem is graphically demonstrated by the way in which school
aged children with handicaps are currently served. Before 1970, the
collective wisdom of professionals was that it would be unethical to place
a child with a moderate to severe handicap in a regular education classroom. The reason was because it was believed that such a child needed
specialized services which could best be provided in a separate classroom
with special teachers, using specialized equipment and curricula. With
the passage of P.L. 94-142, it was suddenly unethical, as well as illegal,
to keep such a child in a separate classroom. Now it was maintained that
such a separate class isolated the handicapped child, prevented social
development, damaged self-concept, and did not prepare the child for the
real world. Thus, the law required that, to the extent possible, children
with handicaps be educated with their non-handicapped peers.
The point is not whether "mainstreaming" is good or bad. The point is
that decisions about what constitutes ethical practice are often made
without sufficient data. Parallels in all types of social programs are painfully obvious. A wide variety of programs are currently used to treat
alcoholism, reduce teenage pregnancy, rehabilitate criminals, etc. Yet,
very few people are willing to submit their program to the type of systematic analysis which would occur in randomized experiments. Their objections are often based on the fact that such experiments would be
unethical. In fact, they are not, because in most cases, we do not yet
know which type of program works best.
When sufficient resources are not available to provide services to all
eligible people, programs are typically provided on either rust-come firstserved, or to those people who are "most in need of help." Generally,
once the available slots are filled, no further effort is made to identify
people in need of services because it is argued that it would be unethical
to identify the people and not provide them with services.
As an example of the problems with this type of an approach, consider a
state which has virtually no publicly-funded prenatal programs for poor
women. The state estimates that there are at least 1,000 women each year
who would be eligible for and benefit from such services if the right type
of service could be designed. Consequently, they offer to provide enough
money to develop and implement a pilot program for 100 women. If it
can be demonstrated that the program is effective, they promise that the
budget will be expanded. From a historical perspective, we can predict
what would happen. Most people would take the money, identify the first
100 women, collect pretest and post-test data, and on the basis of that
data, argue that the program had been effective.
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Not only is such an approach bad science, but it is no more ethical than to
identify 200 women, randomly assign 100 to receive services and use the
other 100 as a control group. Those who argue that such a design would
deny services to the 100 women in the control group seem to forget that
those same women would have gone unserved using the first approach.
In fact, by participating in the randomized experiment, they actually
receive more services since they receive more extensive medical tests as a
result of being in the experiment. Furthermore, if subjects are served on a
first-come first-served basis, the acquisition of services is biased towards
those women who are better-educated, more active in the community, and
better informed. In fact, Campbell (1969) argues that the random allocation of services is the most democratic and moral means of allocating
scarce resources, since a "first-come, first-served" policy perpetuates
social inequality.
The other argument which is used in allocating scarce resources is that
those who are most in need should receive the resources first. This argument was used by Hainsworth (n.d.) in a study designed to provide early
intervention services to children with severe handicaps. Twenty-three
children who met the criteria for receiving services were identified, but
the project only had enough resources to serve half of them. Thus, the 12
children who were most severely handicapped were selected to receive
the services. Such an approach ignores the fact that very little is known
about what type of children benefit most from early intervention services.
Perhaps with this particular program, the more severely handicapped children would make no progress and children with less severe handicaps
would make great progress. If that were true, it is difficult to argue that
the severely handicapped children should be served while the moderately
handicapped children are left unserved. The best way to determine which
children profit most from services is to conduct randomized experiments,
rather than to argue that the most needy children should be served first
based on logical and ethical grounds. Unfortunately, very little such work
has been done.

How Much Do Policy Makers Depend on Scientific Data?
Another reason that the scientific method is used so seldom in advocating
for social programs is that the advocates have learned that although policy
makers frequently demand data, they seldom actually use it to make decisions. Since any old set of data will probably be good enough to clear
this hurdle, why go to all the expense and trouble of collecting good data?
Unfortunately, it is incorrect to assume that if research findings can be
used to demonstrate the value of a program, additional money will be
available for operation and expansion. In fact, research is only one of
several factors (often a relatively insignificant one) which contribute to
decisions of whether to fund or continue a particular program.
A common misperception is that decisions about the development, implementation, and continuation of programs designed to address social needs
are based on a rational scientific approach to problem solving. In other
words, many people believe that politicians and government officials
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objectively appraise available data about needs, select those that are most
urgent, review the various strategies for addressing a particular need,
select the strategy with the highest probability of success based on results
of previous research, and then allocate sufficient funds to develop, implement, and evaluate the success of the program. In these times of tight
budgets, there seems to be the additional belief that only those programs
will be funded which can demonstrate a "profitable return on the original
investment". In other words, in order to receive continued support,
programs must be able to demonstrate earnings or savings at least as great
as the cost of development, implementation, and operation.
Unfortunately, this view of policy formulation is overly simplistic and
substantially inaccurate. In reality, policy formulation is usually a convoluted and ever-changing web of special interests, historical accidents,
politics, imperfect data, and personalities. In an excellent analysis of how
policies for children are made by the federal government, a panel
convened under the direction of the National Academy of Sciences
(Hayes, 1982) concluded that the formation of policy is affected by at
least the following six factors:

1. Contextual factors, including those social, economic,
demographic, political, and ideological factors that shape
the overall context of decision-making.
2. Constituency activities, including direct and indirect pressure, exerted by both organized and unorganized constituencies.
3. Principles and ideas that shape a participant's vision or
policy goal.
4. Actors and institutions, including those that participate
directly in the decision-making process in the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government, and in the
private sector.
5. Media presentations, including television, radio, and the
popular print media.
6. Research including both basic and applied studies; evaluations of existing programs; and data describing the demography or status of certain groups.
These factors continually interact, to greater or lesser degrees, in the
formulation of any given policy. For example, in the late 1960's, a CBS
documentary on hunger in America (media) generated immense public
concern (constituency pressure) about the prevalence of malnutrition in
the United States. The documentary coincided serendipitously with
Hubert Humphrey's efforts (actors and institutions), following defeat in
the Senate committee, to take his battle for enactment of the Special
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Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) to
the floor of the Senate. Using pictures of malnourished infants,
Humphrey touched a humanitarian chord among his colleagues (principles and ideas) and was able to convince them that it was both morally
and politically wise to enact a relatively modest $20 million dollar a year
program via an amendment to another bill (Nelson, 1982). Funding for
the WIC program has since grown to over $1 billion per year (Select
Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 1984).
Even though research findings were of very minor importance in the WIC
legislation, it is possible to find situations where research findings are
highly visible in decisions about whether to fund or continue social
programs. For example, findings of the Westinghouse evaluation of
Headstart (Circirelli, 1969) were used extensively by the Nixon Administration in efforts to dramatically decrease Headstart funding. These
efforts were countered by proponents of Headstart who cited the benefits
attributed to Headstart type programs by the Consortium for Longitudinal
Studies (Lazar and Darlington, 1982).
On both sides of the Headstart issue, however, a careful analysis reveals
there were factors other than research that drove the debate. Research
findings were used by both sides to buttress a position that had evolved
because of contextual factors, constituency pressure, principles, key individuals, and/or media attention. For example, there is ample evidence
that the Nixon Administration used the Westinghouse report as ammunition in a battle plan that had been decided on other factors--a rapidly deteriorating economy and a politically motivated belief that there was too
much "government interference" in the lives of families. On the other
side of the debate, contextual factors (e.g., high unemployment,
increasing poverty, declining test scores) and very strong constituency
pressures by parents and child development specialists, made use of the
Consortium findings to preserve Headstart in spite of the efforts by the
Nixon Administration. It is interesting to note that the research data used
by both sides in this debate were not particularly compelling.
The primary point is not that research is a completely ineffective contribution to the process of policy formulation, but rather to argue against the
widely held belief that if a position can be "proven" by research, then its
enactment as public policy will follow simply as a/ait accompli. In order
to make an effective contribution to the policy process, researchers and
advocates must realize that research findings are only one part of a
complex set of factors which contribute to the formation of public policy.
At times, research findings will lead the debate, but in most instances
research will be used in a supporting role. As a colleague of mine once
remarked, "I use research like a drunk uses a lamp pole--I use it for
support, not for illumination".
Another reason that the scientific approach is not used more frequently
stems from the way in which resources are allocated for social programs.
Typically, state and federal agencies provide money to develop and
implement a particular form of intervention. However, continuation
funding is based on whether the program provider can "prove" that the
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program was effective. With so much personal investment and so many
people's jobs dependent on the continuation of the funding, it is of little
surprise that people generally find that whatever program they are operating is the best program of all. As Campbell and Boruch (1975) pointed
out, "Experiments are feared because in most settings they evaluate not
only the program alternative, but also the administrators, teachers, or
students involved." Because so much has been promised in order to win
support for the program in the first place, it is difficult to subject the
program to systematic, unbiased examination. Consequently, people
resort to methods of advocacy to gain support for the continuation of the
program. Such methods are closely related to tenacity, authority, and
intuition because those methods are more readily available, as well as
more flexible in their application. In other words, it is easier to get the
results to come out in a way that your program will be supported.

Advocacy Masquerading as Science
Properly used, the scientific method can also contribute to advocacy
efforts but such is seldom the case. Most often advocacy masquerades as
science because there- is the perception that arguments presented as scientific data will carry more weight and the advocates are already convinced
that their cause is just. Thus, scientific data is not used to illuminate the
issue, it is used because of the belief that it will make for a more compelling case. All too often, the data presented has all the trappings of scientific data, but it is not.
As an example of how advocacy masquerades as science, consider a
widely cited, actual example from the mid 1970's in which a program for
seriously emotionally disturbed children was seeking additional support
from the state legislature. Services for such children are very expensive,
and in an era of limited resources for human services, such as we've experienced in the United States for the last 25 years, money for such services
is hard to obtain. The needs of children with serious emotional disturbances are obvious, but it is not always obvious that their needs are any
more urgent than dozens of other needs. Furthermore, since it is expensive to address the needs of children with severe emotional disturbances,
such services are scarce and many children go without adequate services.
In an effort to convince others of the importance of providing such
services to emotionally disturbed children, the people at this particular
program (the Regional Intervention Program) decided to do a cost-benefit
analysis of their program. Although they had worked for years trying to
convince legislators and agency administrators of the value and benefits
of the Regional Intervention Program (i.e., they had advocated for their
program based on tenacity, authority, and intuition), they had not used
scientific data to convince legislators that more money should be appropriated. The classic scientific approach would have been to conduct the
kind of comparative experiment used 2,000 years earlier by Daniel of
Lions' Den fame. In other words, identify two comparable groups of children needing the services, provide the services to one group of children
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with the other group of children serving as a control group, wait a sufficient amount of time for the benefits of the program to become evident,
collect data on the costs of delivery and the effects of the program for
children, and then make a comparison between those children who had
participated in the program and those who had not.
Since the most important effects of the Regional Intervention Program
were expected to become evident after the children reached adulthood, it
would have been necessary to wait 20 or more years for the data to have
been available. Because the data were needed more quickly, the people
conducting the study decided to collect the data somewhat differently.
They also wanted to make as strong a case as possible since future
funding for the Regional Intervention Program might depend on the
results of their analysis. Therefore from the 158 children who were
admitted to the program during the previous 3-year period, they selected a
total of 64 children who they believed were candidates for institutional
psychiatric care based on the severity of their handicaps. From these 64
cases they identified 10 representative children, and for each of these children, depending on whether or not they participated in the Regional Intervention Program, the director of the program made a projection
concerning the probable date of admission to an institutional psychiatric
care facility and the probable length of stay in such a facility. The judgements of the director were then corroborated by another special education
professional at the program. In each case, these two experts predicted
that if it weren't for the services of their program, these children would
lead truly miserable lives--all of them would be institutionalized and
become steadily worse. With the program, however, it was predicted that
none of them would need such institutional care.
Are their predictions surprising? Not at all. Think of the last time
someone tried to sell you something, whether it was a vacuum cleaner, a
life insurance policy, or a ticket to the weekend dance. You were probably told of how difficult, even catastrophic, your life would be unless
you bought this particular product. Usually the consequences of failing to
buy the product are not nearly as bad as projected. However, in the case
of the Regional Intervention Program, there was no way of knowing
whether the predictions were true, since there was not comparison group.
The conclusion of this cost-benefit analysis was that society saved almost
$8 in future costs for every dollar spent on the Regional Intervention
Program. Similar conclusions have been reached by other early intervention programs. With such incredibly positive results, one would expect
such treatment programs to be springing up all over the country. In fact,
early childhood special education programs are increasing, but not
dramatically. Why not? Partly because the people who make decisions
about funding such programs know that the numbers given to them by
advocates about cost-benefit are fallacious. Decision makers know such
numbers are fallacious because they've collected and presented similar
data themselves. The numbers have many of the trappings of science, but
they are really pseudo-scientific data. In this particular case we really
don't know how many of the children were institutionalized, there is no
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similar group of children to whom comparisons can be made, and the
people making these judgements obviously had a vested interest. In other
words, the conclusions are not at all credible. Instead of science, this is
really advocacy masquerading as science.
The way in which advocacy masquerades as science was pointed out
dramatically to me during 1984/85, when I spent a sabbatical year in
Washington, D.C .• working as a staff member for the U.S. Senate
Subcommittee on the Handicapped. I received the position as a function
of having been awarded a Congressional Science Fellowship from the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. The stated
purpose of the Congressional Science Fellowships was to provide an
opportunity for scientists to become better informed about the policymaking process; and. for policy makers to become better informed about
the contribution science can make to the formulation of public policy. I
soon learned that only half of this purpose would be fulfilled. More
specifically, although I learned a great deal about how policy was formulated, policy makers were not very interested in how science could be
used to make decisions about the selection or continuation of social
programs. Like the drunk and the lamp pole, they were interested in
finding research which could be used to support an already established
position, but they were not interested in how research could be used to
illuminate the debate about social issues. They were not interested in illumination because they had already made up their mind about what their
position would be. They certainly didn't need data to establish a position.
Because the concept of research is highly valued by the general public,
politicians want to have research data. but such data is used to legitimize
political views which are already established. It is not used to select from
among competing alternatives.
Because politicians and government administrators are so accustomed to
using research to support their pre-established positions. they are skeptical of all research data. In other words. they know that other people are
probably doing the same thing they always do--selectively finding those
data which support their position and ignoring data which does not.
Consider the issue of whether the incidence of serious crime is increasing
or decreasing. One can defend either position depending on which reputable source of data is used. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
compiles an annual report based on a compilation of crimes reported to
local police. The Bureau of Justice statistics. another federal agency,
compiles data about crime based on a random sample of people living in
the United States. In the early 1980's both sources of information showed
that crime was going down. and according to a report published in U.S.
News and World Report (1989), the administration took credit with
Attorney General Edwin Meese proudly proclaiming. "Crime has dropped
sharply for the fIrst time in years. Our firm stand against criminal activity
is a crucial factor."
Unfortunately for the political agenda of the Reagan administration, the
two sources of data showed different results beginning in 1986. The
FBI's data set showed that crime was increasing sharply while the infor19

mation from the Bureau of Justice statistics showed that the crime rate
had plateaued. Now people could take their pick. By referring to the
earlier figures, they could demonstrate that crime was decreasing; by
referring to the figures from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, it could be
demonstrated that the crime rate was remaining steady; and by referring
to the FBI numbers, it could be demonstrated that crime was increasing
dramatically. Depending on the political persuasion and agenda of the
person using the numbers, all three sets of figures have been used.
Another example is the contention that homelessness in America has
reached epidemic proportions. Before approving funding for programs to
address such a problem, politicians and government administrators tend
to want something more specific than a statement that we now have an
epidemic of homelessness. The most frequently cited estimate is that
there are approximately 3,000,000 homeless people in the United States.
While this number is vigorously defended by homeless advocates, its
origins are of a somewhat questionable nature. According to U.S. News
and World Report (1989), homeless advocate Mitch Snyder interviewed
local government agencies in 1980 and provided estimates of the number
of homeless people in 14 cities. These estimates ranged from a few
hundredths of one percent in some cities up to one percent in a few cases.
Even though no estimate of the national incidence was made at that time,
by 1982 Snyder was claiming that his 1980 survey had found that "One
percent of the population, or 2.2 million people lacked shelter." He went
on to say that that number could reach 3 million by 1983.
As the plight of homeless people received increased media attention,
Snyder's estimate of 3 million was frequently repeated until it became a
credible estimate. Other, supposedly more scientific, surveys have been
conducted and have concluded that the estimate attributed to Snyder is
eight to ten times too large. In fact, some years later Snyder told a
Congressional Hearing, "These numbers are in fact, meaningless. We
have tried to satisfy your gnawing curiosity for a number because we ...
have to quantify everything in sight, whether we can or not."
Particularly alarming to the advocates for the homeless is the fact that the
U.S. Census Bureau recently undertook a comprehensive effort to count
homeless people. On March 21, 1990, data collectors set out to count all
of the people living on the streets or in shelters for the homeless. Such an
undertaking created serious concerns among advocates since the estimate
of the number of homeless people is used to make funding decisions and
to decide how serious the problem really is. According to one advocate,
"[The homeless] are mobile; and many don't want to be seen. It will be a
gross undercount. If we treat those numbers as gospel, funding for social
service programs may be cut. That could seriously hurt the homeless."
On the other hand, government officials argue that they have no idea
whether estimates made by such people as Mitch Snyder are at all accurate and cite conflicting estimates based on other surveys.
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Conclusion
During the time I worked on the staff of the United States Senate
Subcommittee for the Handicapped, I experienced first hand the fact that
most people use the results of research the way a drunk uses a lamp pole-they use it for support and not illumination. As long as everyone knows
that both policy makers and advocates are using data for support and not
illumination, advocates will remain impaled on the horns of a dilemma.
If they advocate for a cause or a particular solution without supporting
their position with something that has the trappings of scientific data,
decision makers will tell them to come back later when they have more
scientific data to justify their request. Such a response is usually a
stalling tactic since the decision makers really are not that interested in
the data. If the advocates present scientific data, it will largely be ignored
by the decision makers since they know from personal experience the
way in which such data is collected and used. Thus, the advocates are
punished for not having enough data, but the data is largely ignored when
they do have it.
Is there a way out of this conundrum? I believe there is, but it will not
happen quickly. Even the most zealous advocate would not support a
cause in which he or she did not believe. People who believe that
prenatal care should be more widely available are convinced that there are
positive benefits associated with such care in the same way that people
who advocate for the availability of Laetrile to treat cancer are convinced
that it will be beneficial. The problem with the type of pseudo-scientific
data that is too often used by advocates and policy makers is that sometimes programs are advocated and implemented which are not effective
and may even be harmful. Good science--science which is conducted in a
way that is fair and honest-- can illuminate such issues in a way that will
be convincing to people on both sides of the issue. The problem which
has placed us on the horns of this dilemma is that most of what masquerades as science in addressing the types of social issues outlined at the
beginning of the paper is really so sloppily done, so poorly controlled,
and so obviously biased that it is not surprising that the results are not
believed.
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The solution is for everyone to begin using social science for illumination
and not support. We now have hundreds of examples, of which I have
cited a few, of where such an approach has resulted in significant
progress in ameliorating or solving social problems. To make the change
will require a major shift in the way people view the social sciences, as
well as an awareness of the benefits which are possible. It will also
require a long-term commitment in both funding and patience. Good
science, whether it be putting a man on the moon or deciding how to best
address the needs of handicapped preschoolers and their families, requires
time and financial commitment. Unless we are willing to make such
commitments, the very real needs of the homeless, single parents, handicapped children, alcoholics, and dozens of others will not be addressed as
successfully as they should be.
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